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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
EU Response to  
Disinformation from 
Russia on COVID-19: 
Three Lessons
Russia’s disinformation campaigns 
on COVID-19 are testing the EU. The 
more the Russian state consolidates 
around the idea of a weak West, the 
more likely it will continue to target 
the EU with such onslaughts. Angela 
Merkel’s recent announcement that 
Russia was behind the 2015 cyberat-
tacks on the Bundestag and the up-
coming German presidency of the EU 
Council starting July 1 give the EU 
the opportunity to revise its strate-
gic communication priorities on both 
the coronavirus pandemic and its 
own future.
Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns 
around the coronavirus pandemic have 
two main aims. First, to discredit the 
European Union and expose it as failed 
project; and, second, to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian Russian 
state, thus enhancing its position in 
the international arena. In its euvsdis-
info database, the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) outlined nu-
merous cases of fake stories related to 
COVID-19 that stemmed from Russian 
media outlets – for example, the “pre-
diction” that the pandemic will cause 
the collapse of the Schengen area, the 
paralysis of the EU, and the end of glo-
balization as a whole.
Disinformation pressure from Russia 
is not new. In fact, the vulnerabilities 
of individual EU member states are so 
regularly instrumentalized by pro- 
Kremlin disinformation channels that 
these mechanisms have become an 
integral part of those used by Russia 
in its foreign policy vis-à-vis the EU. 
Moreover, taking into account the Rus-
sian regime’s efforts to cement Putin’s 
power even after 2024, there is not 
much reason to believe that Moscow 
would change its foreign policy tool-
box anytime soon. In other words, the 
more authoritarian this regime will be-
come, the more disinformation cam-
paigns can be expected.
Yet, despite the European Union’s ex-
perience with Russian propaganda 
so far, it still seems not properly pre-
pared to address the issue. First and 
foremost, the EU needs to work on its 
vulnerabilities and develop new ap-
proaches to strengthen internal re-
silience against future disinformation 
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attacks. In May 2020, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel provided the EU 
with momentum for reevaluating its 
current strategic approach to coun-
tering such interventions when she 
announced that she had hard evidence 
that Russia was responsible for the 
cyberattacks on the German Bunde-
stag in 2015 – a marked sharpening of 
the official tone. Germany and the EU 
should consider three lessons in order 
to build on this momentum.
LESSON 1:  
DEBUNKING ALONE 
IS NOT ENOUGH
The strategic communications team 
of EEAS, which focuses on fact-based 
communication and countering dis-
information, is important for damage 
control and needs to be continued. 
Its debunking strategy may, however, 
become ineffective when accurate 
fact-based information is more com-
plex than the false information already 
available in the media space. Psycholo-
gy research on debunking reveals that 
people tend to accept the information 
that corresponds to their world views 
and preexisting attitudes and, thus, 
are highly skeptical of contrasting in-
formation. Debunking becomes par-
ticularly challenging when it tries to 
counter political misinformation be-
cause discussions around such topics 
may become highly emotional.
The biggest challenge to correct-
ing false statements by debunking is 
the persistence of human memory. 
The influence of false information re-
mains even if it has been corrected. 
Researchers call this phenomenon 
“continued influence effect,” which is 
one of the main reasons why an evi-
dence-based approach fails to correct 
a false narrative.
The EU’s slow response to assist-
ing Italy, for example, created fruit-
ful ground for misinterpretation – in 
the eyes of vulnerable populations, it 
made the EU look like it was part of 
the problem rather than the solution. 
Eighty-eight percent of respondents 
to a Monitor Italia survey, which was 
carried out in collaboration with the 
Dire Agency and Tecnè from March 12 
to 13, 2020, believed that the EU was 
not helping Italy. In reality, however, 
the EU provided an aid scheme to Italy 
worth up to €200 billion.
At the same time, Russia was fast to re-
spond to foreign requests for aid al-
though its response to the economic 
impact of the coronavirus pandemic 
at home was cumbersome. Supported 
by an intensive promotion campaign, 
Russia filled the empty communication 
niche left by the EU with suitable nar-
ratives composed of its delivery of mil-
itary medical aid convoys.
While the Russian ambassador to Italy 
provided a long list of equipment de-
livered, he did not provide any data on 
their actual value. Meanwhile, the Ital-
ian daily La Stampa reported that 80 
percent of Russian support was of no 
use to the country. Still, the narrative 
that Russia supported Italians more 
than the EU persists in the Italian pop-
ulation. According to a public opinion 
poll conducted by the research insti-
tute SWG between March 20 and April 
12, 2020, on which countries Italians 
consider “friends,” Russia received ap-
proval by 32 percent of respondents. 
This is an increase of 17 percent in 
comparison to 2019. The same 2020 
poll identifies Germany as Italy’s lead-
ing “foe” as indicated by 45 percent of 
respondents, followed by France (38 
percent) and United Kingdom (17 per-
cent). Although the EU is currently 
providing Italy with the most support, 
it has chosen the wrong approach to 
convey its message.
The core focus of the EU’s strategic 
communications should, therefore, be 
a proactive approach or “pre-bunking.” 
EEAS and the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Communica-
tion (DG COMM) need to develop new 
operational structures to create and 
spread trustworthy European narra-
tives – in general but particularly in 
times of crisis. Had the EU been able 
to efficiently communicate the massive 
value of its assistance package to the 
Italians from early on, it would have 
put the Russian narrative into perspec-
tive and have allowed for a fair com-
parison of the scope of aid provided. 
LESSON 2:  
STRENGTHEN AND 
LEVERAGE REGIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE 
FIGHT AGAINST COVID-19 
Regional ties and cooperation may play 
a crucial role in assuring people that 
a crisis is being addressed as it hap-
pens. Because such cooperation can 
also continue to be believed in after a 
crisis ends, it should be strengthened 
with all available means.
It was highly appreciated, for ex-
ample, when German Federal States 
announced that they would host 
COVID-19 patients from Italy and 
France in their hospitals, and when 
other EU states sent medical equip-
ment to Italy. The coronavirus crisis 
was also a fitting time for the Estonian 
Ministry of Education to start shar-
ing all of its digital education tools to 
support other countries’ education 
systems. 
Unfortunately, these success sto-
ries remained largely within their re-
gional contexts and did not have a 
pan-European impact. Hence, in or-
der to strengthen both regional coop-
eration projects and the EU’s resilience 
against COVID-related disinformation, 
successful regional actions should be 
given EU-level visibility. In practice, 
European leaders should streamline 
their communications and actively 
point out the successes that the EU 
has achieved. 
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LESSON 3:  
INCREASE TRUST BY  
BOLD DEMONSTRATIVE  
GESTURES
The Italian public’s level of trust in the 
EU and some of its member states, in-
cluding Germany, has changed for the 
worse. According to data collected by 
SWG and reported in Italian news, Ital-
ians’ trust in the EU has fallen from 
42 percent last September to 27 per-
cent this April. Over that same period, 
trust in the European Commission de-
creased from 41 to 24 percent and in 
the European Central Bank from 43 to 
25 percent. 
It will certainly not be easy for the 
EU to reconcile with Italy and dimin-
ish the growing gap in the north-south 
division of EU member states. Bold po-
litical gestures may, however, help to 
restore trust. One of the most mem-
orable moments in European history 
was the Warschauer Kniefall, a gesture 
of humility and penance by West Ger-
man Chancellor Willy Brandt to bridge 
the sorrow and frustration in (politi-
cal) relations between West Germany 
and Poland. Once the acute initial 
phase of the coronavirus pandemic is 
over, Germany along with other EU 
member states should, perhaps, initi-
ate a collective EU commemoration to 
both honor the victims of the virus and 
shift the focus toward the future of the 
European Union. The upcoming Ger-
man presidency of the EU Council that 
starts on July 1 could be a suitable mo-
ment for such a suggestion.
If the European Commission intends to 
maintain its ambition of being a “geo-
political Commission,” it needs to be 
based in a strong and resilient Europe-
an Union – one that is ready to back its 
decisions and respond in one voice to 
the external challenges posed by Rus-
sia. For this, the EU needs to change 
its reactive strategy. Instead, it should 
proactively build on its own successes, 
thereby also addressing growing inter-
nal contradictions.
